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The Commerce Clause and the Balancing
Approach: The Delineation of Federal and State
Interests: United Transportation Union v. Long
Island Rail Road
The answer seems to be that the Constitution of the United
States establishes [that] state governments . . in certain matters are . . . independent of the [federal] government.'

.

Prior to National League of Cities v. Usery2 courts had increasingly invoked the commerce clauses to uphold the federal
regulation of an expanding variety of activities, including many
which were not purely interstate. In fact, the Supreme Court
had begun to uphold federal regulation of entirely intrastate activities,' reasoning that even those activities often have a substantial effect on commer~e.~
The increased domain of federal
1. K. WHEARE,
FEDERALGOVERNMENT
2 (4th ed. 1964).
2. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The decision dealt with the application of the minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to state
and local governmental employees. See 29 U.S.C. $ 203 (1976) (as amended in 1974). In a
five-to-four decision with Justice Blackmun concurring, the Court determined that Congress could not invoke the commerce clause to directly displace state management in
areas of traditional governmental functions nor interfere with the states in their sovereign capacities. Such exercise of congressional authority could not be rationalized with
the federal system of government as set forth in the Constitution. Usery has been the
subject of numerous articles and discussions since the decision reversed a trend of an
expansive reading of the commerce clause that had been developing for nearly forty
years. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
3. "The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Na. ." U.S. CONST.art. I, g 8, cl. 3.
tions, and among the several States
4. For example, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the court upheld
the restraints of the Fair Labor Standards Act as being within the commerce power and
consistent with the f i h and tenth amendments:
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate
which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress
over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Id. at 118.
5. "Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the
power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States
of origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful effect upon that

..
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regulation caused apprehension that the reach of national power
into state affairs was becoming too broad and that virtually all
intrastate activity might be regulated under the commerce
power of the national go~ernment.~
The concern that all intrastate commerce would eventually
be subject to federal regulation was eased by Usery, where the
Supreme Court manifested a revived sensitivity toward the potentially detrimental effect of federal regulation on the
automony of state and local governments. In an earlier case, the
Court had described federalism as a system which is committed
"to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though
it may be to indicate and protect . . . federal interests, always
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with
the legitimate activities of the States. '- Consequently, the
commerce." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,258 (1964). The
Supreme Court observed that the regulatory power of Congress to remove obstructions
of commerce, so far as it applied to public accomodations in eliminating racial discrimination, was subject to only one restriction, "that the means chosen by it must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution." Id. at 261-62. See also Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (Lottery Case).
The difliculty remains, however, as to what extent the Constitution will serve to
protect the sovereignty of the states. The tenth amendment provides, "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.amend. X. However, whether the Court will permit the amendment to actually operate for the benefit of
the states in areas of federal regulation is questionable. In Darby, for example, the court
stated, "The [tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered." 312 U.S. at 124. Contrasting modem views are found in Usery, 426
U.S. at 842-43, and 426 U.S. at 862-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Consequently, a coherent and equitable rationale is needed to support reliance on the tenth amendment as a
restraint upon federal interference with legitimate state interests. See e.g., Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 549-59 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v. Oregon,
366 U.S. 643 (1961).
6. As an extreme example, see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), which
dealt with loan sharking in a local community. After discussing the commerce clause, the
Court concluded that loan sharking, "though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of
Congress affect interstate commerce." Id. at 154. Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, felt
that the Court had overreached by allowing a conviction without any proof or facts
showing that the conduct affected interstate commerce, stating, "[tlhe definition and
prosecution of local, intrastate crime are reserved to the States under the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments." Id. at 158.
7. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,44 (1971) (emphasis added). In order to determine
whether the limits of the federal regulatory power have been surpassed, one commentator believes it must be shown "that the interference is undue, and that determination in
turn, requires that the intrusion into the state governmental process and its effect be
balanced against the need of the federal government to enact the regulation." Matsumoto, National League of Cities-From Footnote to Holding-State Immunity from
PERSPECCommerce Clause Regulrrtion, 1977 ARIZ.ST. L.J. 35, 59. See also C. BLACK,

.
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"state sovereignty" doctrine of National League of Cities v.
Usery confirmed the restraint on federal use of the commerce
clause to regulate the functions of state government.
Some believed that the doctrine enunciated in Usery might
eventually be extended to activities not previously regarded as
integral or traditional state functions and applied to any activity
in which the state was actively engaged? However most circuit
courts have not extended the rationale of Usery in subsequent
cases involving conflicts between federal and state interests?
Preference has been given to the federal interest unless there
has existed a state interest especially deserving of protection
under the particular circumstances before the court.10

United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road"
supports the view that the federal government's power to regulate commerce should yield to the legitimate state interest in
preserving the right to control certain state functions. New York
State, through the Metropolitan Transportation Authority
m s IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW(1970), which suggests that the assessment of the constitutionality of an exercise of federal regulatory power should encompass state autonomy
considerations, a procedure which should not lessen the supremacy of the federal government over state governments.
8. See, e.g., Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power
and State Sovereignty Rediviuus, 46 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1115,1133 (1978). "The evil that
may be done by raising the ghost of state sovereignty may, however, outlive the immediate decision of the Court, important though it may be," id. a t 1134, and "the revived
doctrine . . . may apply to all state activities, rather than only those which may be considered to involve essential governmental functions." Id. a t 1125 (emphasis added). See
also National League .of Cities v. Uaery, 426 U.S. a t 833,856-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9. See e.g., New Hampshire v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240,244-47 (1st Cir. 1980); United
States v. Helsley, 615 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1979); Vehicle Equip. Safety Comm'n v.
National Highway TrafEc Safety Administration, 611 F.2d 53, 54-55 (4th Cir. 1979);
Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1979); Pearce v. Wichita County,
590 F.2d 128, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1979); Jennings v. Illinois Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935,
938 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979); Public Serv. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 587 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Scott, 581 F.2d 589, 592 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 160 n.25 (2nd
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1 (7th
Cir. 1978); New York v. United States, 574 F.2d 128, 131 n.6 (2nd Cir.), aff'd,439 U.S.
920 (1978). Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (4th Cir. 1977).
10. See, e.g., Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979); Donohoe Constr. Co. v. Montgomery County Council, 567 F.2d 603, 609, 609 n.17 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 905 (1978); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 33,
38 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); Davids v. Alsers, 549 F.2d 120, 127 (9th
Cir. 1977); Wentworth v. Solem, 548 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 1977).
11. 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980).
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(MTA),12 manages the Long Island Rail Road Company
(LIRR).lSThe LIRR is a common carrier that serves five counties in the New York City metropolitan area and is the only
common carrier by rail connecting the public with industry in
the surrounding counties. The primary function of the LIRR is
to provide passenger service, though freight operations constitute a limited share of the business.14 As one of seven collective
bargaining representatives for the LIRR operating and train employees, the United Transportation Union (Union)l5 had proposed changes in the employment agreement regarding rates of
pay, rules, and working conditions.le After extensive negotiations," the Union was on the verge of exhausting the collective
bargaining procedures provided by the Federal Railway Labor
Act? On December 7, 1979, the Union filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the relationship between the parties was
governed by the Federal Railway Labor Act1@and that the em12. The MTA, which still has the day-to-day responsibility for the management of
the railroad, is a public benefit corporation. Id. at 20-21.
13. The railroad was acquired by the State of New York in January, 1966. On February 8, 1980, the railroad was converted from a private stock corporation to a public
benefit corporation. Id.
14. The total income of the LIRR approximates $300 million. The revenue from
freight operations in 1979 was in excess of $12.1 million, but that figure is miniscule in
comparison to the overall income of the railroad. Id. at 20-21. The income from the
freight revenues exceeded $18 million in 1978. United Transp. Union v. Long Island
R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300, 1304 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
15. United Transportation Union is the sole representative directly involved in this
suit, although the other representatives filed amicus curiae briefs. See United Transp.
Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300, 1301 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
16. Brief for Appellee at 1.
17. The negotiations continued over an eighteen-month period. Long Island R.R.
Co. v. United Transp. Union, 484 F. Supp. 1290, 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
18. 45 U.S.C. $8 151-188 (1976).
19. The Railway Labor A d does not explicitly allow for the parties to resort to selfhelp (strike). However, federal case law has indicated that employees subject to the Act
may resort to self-help once the grievance procedures provided for in the collective bargaining agreement have been exhausted. But see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380 (1969).
The Act provides:
The purposes of the chapter are: (1) To avoid riny interruption to commerce or
to the operation of any carrier engaged therein; (2) to forbid any limitation
upon freedom of association among employees or any denial, as a condition of
employment or otherwise, of the right of the employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete independence of carriers and of employees in the matter of self-organization to carry out the purposes of this chapter;
(4) to provide for the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes concerning
rates of pay, rules, or working conditions; (5) to provide for the prompt and
orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the inter-
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ployees, should they engage in self-help, were not subject to the
sanctions of New York's Taylor Law,"O which prohibits strikes
by public employee^.^^ The Union also sought injunctive relief to
protect the rights of the employees guaranteed under the federal
act, including an injunction against the commencement of a
state court action invoking the Taylor Law. On December 8,
1979, the Union, along with the other six unions, went on strike.
A Presidential Emergency Board was established on December
14, 1979,'2 and the union employees returned to work? On February 8, 1980, two months after the district court action was
filed, MTA converted the LIRR from a private stock corporation
to a public benefit corporation, whose employees would technically be subject to the state's Taylor Law."
Following further litigation,a6 the Union moved for summary judgment. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that the LIRR was a "carrier" engaged in
interstate transportation and consequently subject to the Railway Labor Act." The district court rejected the invitation to
find that the federal regulation improperly displaces the freedom of the state to structure its integral operations in those arpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working
conditions.
45 U.S.C. 8 1512 (1976).
20. N.Y. CIV.SERV.LAW$8 200-214 (McKinney 1978).
21. "No public employee or employee organization shall engage in a strike, and no
public employee or employee organization shall cause, instigate, encourage, or condone a
strike." N.Y. CIV. SEW. LAWS8 210(1) (McKinney 1978).
22. 634 F.2d at 21. The statutory authorization for this function can be found in
Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 8 160 (1976).
23. 634 F.2d at 21. The President's action authorized a "cooling off' period of sixty
days. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300, 1302 (E.D.N.Y.
1980).
24. 634 F.2d at 21. Prior to that date, the MTA and LIRR had moved to dismiss the
action. That motion was not heard before the LIRR was converted to a public benefit
corporation. Id.
25. On February 12, the Union moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief to prevent a state court action under the Taylor Law to enjoin a
strike by Union members. On February 13, the LIRR commenced suit in the Supreme
Court, New York County, seeking an injunction under the Taylor Law against the impending strike by the Union. On February 14, after a temporary restraining order was
issued, that action was removed to the United State District Court for the Southern
District of New York. On February 25, that action was then transferred and consolidatd
with the district court case. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp.
1300, 1301-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
26. Id. at 1305.
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eas which are traditionally termed "governmental functions,"
concluding that the federal scheme preempts the state from regulating the labor relations of the railroad's employee^."^ In the
view of the district court, employees of the LIRR who have exhausted the bargaining and mediation procedures of the Railway
Labor Act have a federally guaranteed right to strike, and that
right may not be prohibited through the enforcement of the
Taylor Law? The district court then issued an injunction restraining the LIRR and the MTA from taking any action in
state court based on an alleged violation of the Taylor Law. The
Union, however, was enjoined from striking"@pending review by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit reversedosoIn drawing the line which
separates state and federal regulation, Judge Sweet," writing for
the ~ o u r t , 8first
~ noted that the district court had correctly determined that the LIRR was a "carrier" within the meaning of
the Railway Labor ActassEven though the Act did not specifically include local transportation systems within its coverage,
the Second Circuit declined to exclude the public commuter railroad from coverage under the Act, in spite of arguments that
Congress would have done so had it foreseen how the railroad
would evolveoMHowever, the court recognized that the LIRR
may be subject to the literal terms of the Act, and even though
Usery arguably excludes railroads from the definition of what
the
constitutes an integral part of state governmental a~tivity,'~
27. Id. at 1306.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1309. The labor dispute which gave rise to the court action was ultimately
settled on April 11, 1980. 634 F.2d at 21 n.6.
30. 634 F.2d at 20.
31. United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
designation. Id. at 20 n**.
32. Joining in the opinion were Circuit Judge Mulligan and Judge Spears, United
States District Judge for the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation. Id. at 20
n*.
33. Id. at 22.
34. Id. at 23. The court did not seem bothered by the conversion of the LIRR to a
public benefit corporation which made the railroad facially subject to the Taylor Law.
The conversion appears to have been made solely for the purpose of avoiding the regulation of the Railway Labor Act and to prohibit the Union employees from striking after
the collective bargaining process had been exhausted.
35. Id. at 23-26. Usery did not "extend the protective mantle of sovereignty to 'areas that the States have not regarded as integral parts of their governmental activities,'
such as operating a railroad." Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Y m L.J. 1165, 1172
(1977) (citing 426 U.S. at 854 n.18).
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Railway Labor Act arguably does not apply to a publicly-owned
local commuter transportation system such as the LIRR merely
because it engages in a minimal, yet significant, amount of interstate freight business." The court reasoned that enforcement of
the Act may impair the state's ability to shape employer-employee relationships in its role as the sole provider of an essential public servicew and applied the analysis promulgated in
Usery:

.

The inquiry is therefore essentially two-tiered. . . [W]e
must first consider whether the operation of the railroad qualifies as an integral or traditional government function. If it
does, the federal interest in regulating the collective bargaining
relations of LIRR employees under the Railway Labor Act
must be weighed against the State's interest in applying the
Taylor Law?

In the first step of the analysis, the Second Circuit reasoned
that "essentiality is gauged not only in terms of the nature of a
public service, but also its availability in the marketpla~e."~~
The court recognized that the LIRR was predominantly a public
commuter-passenger service and that the railroad as public mass
transit was becoming an alternative mode of transportation in
several major metropolitan areas.40The court also noted the potential economic effect on the community if the service were discontinued. Furthermore, the opinion stated that well over eighty
percent of the company revenue is generated by the purely intrastate passenger service, and only four percent ($12 million of
36. 634 F.2d at 22-23.
37. Id. at 23-24.
38. Id. at 24.
39. Id. at 29. The availability of the service in the marketplace is certainly an important consideration. That is precisely one of the distinctions between the case considered here and Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). The Seeond Circuit in United Transportation Union considered the impkt of Lafayette on
Usery, concluding that the case should be limited to its antitrust context. Though the
enterprise involved there, a municipally owned electric utility, was on par with the importance of the commuter railroad as a public service, that service was not provided
solely by the state. Rather, the City of Lafayette competed with private enterprise for
customers. The existence of an alternative source for that service demonstrates that enforcement of the state regulation was not essential for the benefit of the public and that
it was economically feasible for private enterprise to provide the needed service. 634 F.2d
at 27-28.
40. 634 F.2d at 26-27. Miami will open a public mass transit system in 1982. Transit
systems already exist in New York, Atlanta, Chicago, Boston, and San Francisco. Id. at
26 n.20.
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$300 million in total revenue) by the interstate freight service."
Therefore, since the railroad was provided solely by the state,
the court reasoned that the LIRR could be characterized as an
essential governmental function? The decision was in line with
reasoning that "[tlhe ownership or operation of a railroad . .
may be deemed, in certain regions, as essential as the operations
of bridges, street lights, or a sewage system."4s The court explained that "[o] bviously, the catalog of essential state-provided
services is not and cannot be static."44
The court then weighed the competing federal and state interests. The purposes of both the Railway Labor Act and the
Taylor Law are to avoid the interruption of commerce, to provide an orderly method of dispute resolution, and to insure continuous service.4s The court acknowledged that the right to
strike free from state interference has been held essential to the
federal scheme of r e g ~ l a t i o n .Nevertheless,
since the service
~~
was state-provided and generated primarily intrastate revenues,
the federal interest in allowing the employees to engage in selfhelp was not "demonstrably greater"47 than the state's interest

.

41. Id. at 20-21. The remaining 16% is apparently generated by various miscellaneous sources. It is not accounted for in the instant case.
42. Id. at 25-27.
43. Comment, National League of Cities and the Parker Doctrine: The Status of
URB.L.J. 301,311 (1980). In
State Sovereignty under the Commerce Clause, 8 FORDHAM
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), Justice Douglas stated:
A State may deem it as essential to its economy that it own and operate a
railroad, a mill, or an irrigation system as it does to own and operate bridges,
street lights, or a sewage disposal plant. What might have been viewed in an
earlier day as an improvident or even dangerous extension of state activities
may today be deemed indispensible.
Id. at 591 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1125; Amersbach
v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (6th Cir. 1979).
44. 634 F.2d at 26.
151a (1976) with N.Y. CIV. SERV.LAW§ 211
45. Id. at 29. Compare 45 U.S.C.
(McKinney 1978).
46. "The Railway Labor Act's entire scheme for the resolution of major disputes
would become meaningless if the States could prohibit the parties from engaging in any
self-help." Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
381 (1969) (emphasis in original). Any effort by the state to inhibit the self-help provisions of the Railway Labor Act would frustrate the effective implementation of the Act.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, disagreed with the majority's characterization of the issue as
being whether "the States could prohibit the parties from engaging in any self-help." Id.
at 397 (emphasis in original). Rather he argued that the scheme of the Act is to provide
for the settlement of labor disputes under a variety of measures, not to grant the employees an unrestricted "right" to strike.
47. This was the phrase used by Justice Blackmun in Usery. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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in preserving the unimpeded flow of commuter transportation.
The court determined that the inability to prohibit strikes by
public employees and the economic effect thereof would deprive
the state of the right to make "fundamental employment decisions" essential to its "separate and independent existen~e."~~
The Second Circuit then proceeded to extend the state sovereignty doctrine of Usery to exempt the public commuter railroad with interstate connections from federal regulation, even
though the operation of a railroad had not previously been regarded as an integral or traditional state function.4@The court
emphasized that they were guided by the ground-breaking holding of Usery:
States as States stand on a quite different footing from an individual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate commerce. . . . Congress may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon the States its
choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of
integral governmental functions are to be madeP0

The approach taken by the court in United Transportation
Union v. Long Island Rail RoadB1was well reasoned and effec48. 426 U.S. at 851. See 634 F.2d at 30.
49. 634 F.2d at 26, 30. See United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), where
even though the railroad was owned by the State of California, the United States Supreme Court found the railroad subject to the provisions of the Federal Safety Act. In
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957), which involved a common carrier owned and
operated by the State of California, the state civil service laws were in conflict with the
provisions of the Railway Labor Act. The court reasoned that "by engaging in interstate
commerce by rail, [the state] subjects itself to the commerce power so that Congress can
. . . regulate its employment relationships." Id. at 568. Also, Usery states that the "activity to which the congressional command was directed was not in an area that the
States have regarded as integral parts of their governmental activities. It was, on the
contrary, the operation of a railroad . . . ." 426 U.S. at 854 11.18. The Second Circuit in
United Transportation Union did not feel that the decision in United States v. California concluded the issue. Rather the court felt that the definition of state sovereignty in
Usery suggested that "traditional" and "integral" must be defined to meet changing
times. 634 F.2d at 26. See Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir.
1979). The railroad in United States v. California, even though state owned and operated intrastate like the LIRR, was a freight service, which clearly distinguishes it from
the LIRR, which provides an invaluable public function of passenger transportation in a
metropolitan area.
50. 634 F.2d at 30 (quoting 426 U.S. at 854-55).
51. The Second Circuit has adhered to the principle of weighing the competing
interests.
In determining whether an otherwise valid exercise of the federal commerce
power would impermissibly impair state sovereignty we [are] therefore re-
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tive, but the decision fails to provide adequate guidelines for future federal and state regulatory conflictsmand to alleviate concerns that federal regulatory powers are being deprived of their
effectiveness. A better approach would present fairly objective
standards for the courts to apply in determining whether certain
services which are being gathered into the expanding arena of
state endeavorMare protected from federal intervention. Illusive
concepts such as "integral," "traditional," and "essential" have
been used in United Transportation Union and Usery, as well
as other cases, without formulating an easily applicable procedure for determining which state activities fall under the meaning of those terms. The use of flexible, yet clearly defined standards would adequately delineate the federal and state interests
and provide stability and direction for this area of the law.
Previously suggested guidelines for determining the sphere
of protected state functions have not been suf'Ecient for many
circumstances. Such guidelines are too dependent upon political
concerns and are either tailored too narrowly, fitting only the
quired to balance the reason for the exercise against the extent of usurpation
of state policy-making or invasion of integral state functions that would result,
giving "appropriate recognition to the legitimate concerns of each
government."
634 F.2d at 29 (quoting Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 37 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977) (emphasis added)). Although Friends of the Earth dealt
with a municipal entity challenging enforcement of an EPA-promulgated anti-pollution
regulation, the court, in line with Usery, stated that "Congress is prohibited by the
Tenth Amendment from using its power under the Commerce Clause to impair 'attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government' and that these attributes extend
to a state's political subdivisions, including local governmental units." 552 F.2d at 33.
52. 634 F.2d at 30. As technology develops and society expands, the standards must
remain somewhat flexible and yet well-defined to deal with the variations. Just as the car
eventually replaced the horse and buggy, it is reasonably foreseeable that with our rapidly increasing population and improved technology the automobile will be replaced by
other, perhaps more convenient and safe modes of transportation, including mass transit.
"Moreover, we cannot be blind to the sweep of the world wide events which by all indications is forcing substantial alteration of our former profligate transportation practices
and undeniably will create reliance on public mass transit." Id. at 27. In turn, it should
be recognized that state and federal regulation of the new developments is sure to follow.
53. Since several states now provide public mass transit, usually due to public demand and necessity, it is not unreasonable to assume that the state is likely to become
involved in other areas which are or were solely within the domain of private enterprise.
Further, even though mass transit had not been available to the public sector until recently, the Second Circuit in United Transportation Union determined that:
Although this is a relatively new development, there is now no reasoned basis
for finding that the operation of an intrastate passenger service which transports tens of thousands to and from their jobs every day is any less a governmental function than are sanitation or public parks and recreation.
Id. at 27. See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851.
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cases from which they were formulated, or tailored too broadly,
failing to provide an ascertainable standard to limit their application. One of those suggested guidelines has been the "essen. ~ commentator who expressed resertiality" of the s e r ~ i c e One
vation when Usery refused to extend state regulatory control to
the operation of a publicly owned railroads5 suggested several
factors to consider in defining an essential state function. Such
factors include whether the state could furnish the service more
effectively than a private entity, the availability of that service
to the public at large, and the support for the service within the
l o ~ a l i t yThe
. ~ author believed the factors to be relatively simple
to measure and apply. The factors, however, depend, to a varying degree, on the political tenor of the community, a tenor that
is unlikely to remain constant. A clearer set of elements for determining whether a protected governmental function exists can
, ~ ~ the emphabe found in Arnersbach v. City of C l e ~ e l a n dwhere
sis seemed to be upon certain economic considerations and community need. In that case, however, the elements were keyed to
the "public service" rationale, which is potentially unlimited in
its application since nearly every activity that affects the public
interest may constitute a state function exempt from federal intervention. The determination of whether the service provided
by the state is exempt from federal regulation should involve
54. Judge Sweet, in United Transportation Union, focused on the essential nature
of the service provided by the state in terms of the public need and the availability of
the service in the marketplace. 634 F.2d at 29.
55. Michelman, supra note 35, at 1172.
56. "Essentiality" would reside in just this fact of actual political acceptance of
some view as (i) the service is a "public good" in the microeconomic sense,
collective provision of which tends towards better satisfaction of private preferences than the private market could achieve; or (ii) the service is something
that must be made freely available to everyone as a condition of some other
social-justice conception that the electorate has accepted; or (iii) it is in the
commdity's interest that the rules of legitimate po&al struggle should be
honored, and the service is one for which there is prevailing local support
under those rules.
Id. at 1177 (footnotes ommitted).
57. 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979). Other factors the court in Amersbach postulated
were:
(1) the government service or activity benefits the community as a whole and is
available to the public at little or no direct expense; (2) the service or activity
is undertaken for the purpose of public service rather than for pecuniary gain;
(3) government is the principal provider of the service or activity; and (4) government is particularly suited to provide the service or perform the activity
because of a community wide need for the service or activity.
Id. at 1037.
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factors relevant to the immediate controversy. Such an approach
would allow the expansion of state interests to be dealt with in a
predictable manner," with attention given to the pertinent circumstances of each case."@
Guidelines that define those state activities that should be
exempt from federal regulation need to be designed to fairly justify state autonomy from the federal interest. Therefore, the disputed activity or service should not be exempt from federal regulation unless (1) the service is provided by the state; (2) the
service, if revenue generating, derives its revenues primarily
from intrastate commerce; (3) no alternative service is available
in the private sector; (4) the service is necessary to the public
and no alternative service can be provided by the state without
substantial adjustment in the community; and (5) the federal interest, with particular emphasis on public policy considerations,
does not otherwise outweigh the state interest.
First, the disputed service must be provided by the state in
order to justify displacement of the federal regulation. The requirement of state involvement insures a direct state interest in
the service. Unless the service is state provided, there would be
no justification for a claim that the federal regulation infringes
upon any "state" function." It is not s d c i e n t that the state be
58. The approach, by necessity, should not be haphazard since
[A] stoppage in utility service so clearly involves the needs of a community as
to invoke instinctively the power of government. This Court should not ignore

history and economic facts in construing federal legislation that comes within
the area of interacting State and federal control. To derive from the general
language of the federal act a "right" to strike in violation of a State law regulating public utilities is to strip from words the limits inherent in their context.
Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 405 (1951) (Frankfurter J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The case dealt with the constitutionality of Wisconsin's labor legislation known as
the Public Utility Anti-Strike Law.
59. "The adjustment thus called for between State and National interests is not
attained by reliance on uncritical generalities or rhetorical phrases unnourished by the
particularities of specific situations." Id. at 403.
60. In Usery, the Supreme Court found that Congress may not exercise its power
over interstate commerce to regulate state functions in the same manner it is allowed to
control private enterprise.
It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating
individual businesses necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the State in which they reside. It is quite another to
uphold a similar exercise of congressional authority directed, not to private
citizens, but to the States as States.
426 U.S.at 845. The fact that a state function is involved, however, does not end the
analysis. That function must comply with additional requirements to escape federal

1891

CASE NOTES

201

merely associated with the disputed function; limits must be
placed upon the reach of alleged state interests. To allow the
"state interest" to reach those activities not furnished by the
state merely because they affect certain state functions would,
like the "public service" analysis, be potentially limitless in application." However, if the service is furnished by the state and
would not have been available to the community unless it was
state supported, i.e., it is not economically feasible or the private
sector is unwilling to undertake the business, then the argument
for enforcing the state statute is heightened. In United Transportation Union, the LIRR was a state owned and operated
public commuter railroad. Therefore, the first requirement
would have been satisfied.
Second, where the state-provided service is revenue generating, such revenues must be derived primarily from intrastate
commerce to exempt the function from federal regulation. In
United Transportation Union, well over eighty percent of the
revenues derived from the LIRR were generated by intrastate
activities. Therefore, this factor weighed in favor of prohibiting
federal regulation of the state service. The entity having the
preemption.
61. Due to apprehension that Usery will lead to a greater expansion of essential
state functions, the court in United Transportation Union and most commentators have
shied away from allowing an activity considered a "public service" to escape federal regulation for that reason alone. "Thus, it is in the area of federal regulatory power in which
an extension of the . . . [Usery] decision has the greatest potential for future application." Matsumoto, supra note 7, at 80. An "essential public service" test was rejected in
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974), which determined that
since the "supplying of a utility service is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the State," there was not the requisite state action, even though the privately owned and
operated utility was subject to extensive state regulation. Only those activities which are
or may become a state function, subject to the clarifications mentioned above, should be
protected from federal intervention. This does not include those enterprises in which the
state is only provisionally involved.
It is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses "affected" with
a public interest . . . . The phrase "affected with a public interest" can, in the
nature of things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is
subject to control for the public good. In several of the decisions of this court
wherein the expressions "affected with a public interest," and "clothed with a
public use," have been brought forward as the criteria . . . it has been admitted that they are not susceptible of definition and form an unsatisfactory test

....

Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934). This in itself indicates the numerous
functions the "public service" test could encompass. The court in United Transportation Union did, in fact, discuss the "public service" analysis when considering the "essentiality" of the state function-its need by the public and availability in the marketplace. See 634 F.2d at 29.
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dominant economic interest in the activity will certainly have
adequate justification for the furtherance and protection of its
interests.
Third, the state service should not be exempt from federal
regulation where a comparable service is available within the
private sector. If a similar service is furnished by private enterprise and is readily available to the public sector, then the state
function is unlikely to be characterized as essential. The state
should not be allowed undue advantages when in direct competition with private enterprise. If a state were allowed to restrict
the activities of public employees, and similarly situated private
businesses could not regulate the activities of their employees in
the same manner, the resulting benefit to the state and disparate treatment of public and private employees is obvious. In
United Transportation Union, the LIRR was the only service of
its kind available. The service was provided solely by the state.
Additionally, the LIRR was converted to a public corporation,
indicating that it was no longer practical for the private sector
(or they were unwilling) to provide a similar service.
Fourth, if the public service were discontinued, the adjustments necessary for the state to furnish an alternative service
must be impractical or costly, and the economic and social impact on the community extensive. This factor requires an examination of the physical and economic, as well as the less tangible,
effects upon the public and private entities involved with or connected to the service. If the physical modifications necessary to
provide a substitute for the public service are impractical and
costly, then continuation of the public service, regulated by the
state, may be the most viable choice.62The economic considerations and societal involvement with the public service and its
operation often directly influence or determine the public support for and use of the facility. Consideration, then, should be
given to whether the economic loss to the state and community
would be substantial should the federal regulation be enforced."
62. William J. Ronan, then Chairman of the New York State Metropolitan Commuter Transit Authority, indicated that without the LIRR,ten blocks in the center of
New York City would be necessary just for parking and that it would necessitate twentysix lanes of expressway, each way, to handle t r a c . See Effect of Railroad Mergers on
Commuter Transportation: Hearings before the Subcommission on Housing and Urban
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Seas. 1138
(1970).
63. Due to an eleven day transit strike in April of 1980, New York City lost an
estimated $1.1 billion, and private business lost $100 million per day. Cirrillo, New
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Where the economic prosperity of %?the
private and public segments of the state are materially enhanced through state regulation, or would suffer substantial setbacks through assertion of
the federal interest, then the state interest should prevail. hloreover, special consideration should be given to those benefits not
easily measured in economic terms that are derived from the respective interests. Those benefits might include the convenience
that the presence of the service furnishes to the public sector,
the ease of administration over the service as opposed to possible alternatives, and other beneficial aspects, if any, gained from
the service. If the use by the public is not substantial, then the
effect on the community if the service were discontinued, at
least temporarily, would probably not be prohibitive. In that circumstance, the public service should potentially be subject to
federal regulation. Indeed, the amount of use is an excellent indication of the community support for the service in weighing
the need for state, as opposed to federal, regulation thereof. As
indicated previously, in United Transportation Union the impact on the metropolitan area would have been material had the
LIRR ceased operation even temporarily.
Fifth, if the state interest best serves the public welfare, in
recognition of the requirements of public policy, then the federal
regulation should give deference to the state interest. In United
Transportation Union, the purposes behind the federal and
state regulations were similar; so this factor was not determinative. However, in other cases involving federal and state legislation, the purposes of the respective regulations may differ substantially. In those instances, examination of the legislative
background is important because legislation usually represents
an effort to implement public policy." Public policy requires
that the basic needs of the populace be provided for and that
the "essential" services which connect the metropolitan area
continue uninterrupted. This is true even though that policy is
in derogation of the interests of a certain group, such as the railroad employees in the instant case. Further, the mere existence
Yorkers Ride Again, ASSOCIATED
PRESS,April 12, 1980. Also, the impact of the transit
strike on New York City in 1966 caused substantial business losses, traffic congestion,
and disruption of the public sector. N.Y.Times, Jan. 16, 1966, 5 1, at 1, col. 1.
64. "Because integral operations represent policy choices about 'the manner in
which [states] deliver . . . governmental services which their citizens require,' . . . [Congressional legislation] which necessarily affects policy choices, is integral to the operation
of state and local governments." Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Analyses in the
Law of Federal Jurisdiction, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV.1301, 1338 (1978) (footnote omitted).
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of a federal regulation should not conclude the issue; rather the
state interest must be considered as part of the analysis." The
regulation should be related to a legitimate state intere~t:~and
the means chosen to effectuate that interest should be
considered."'
Finally, the result sought through implementation of the
federal regulatory scheme should be taken into consideration.
When enforcement of the state regulation will necessarily circumvent some federal act, a determination should be made as to
whether that displacement is warranted or whether there has
been an undue interference with the federal regulatory scheme?
This fifth factor should serve to gather the determinations made
under the previous factors and ensure that each of the pertinent
elements is fairly considered. Therefore, if the federal government's interest in preserving the rights of those involved with
the public service can be served through alternative means, such
as the collective bargaining procedures available in United
Transportation Union, then the federal scheme of regulation
would not be improperly displaced by the enforcement of the
state statute.

In a government such as ours, the size and reach of the federal interest should not obscure the limited, though consequential, state interest? In determining whether state activities are
exempt from federal regulation, the courts should weigh the advantages of allowing diverse responses to local needs against the
65. "[A] State is not merely a factor in the 'shifting economic arrangements' of the
private sector of the economy, . . . but is itself a coordinate element in the system established by the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. at 849 (citations omitted).
66. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186 (1950);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945).
67. L. TRIBE,AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW341 (1978).
68. "States are not immune from all federal regulation under the Commerce Clause
merely because of their sovereign status." Fry v. United States, 421 US. 542, 548 (1975)
(quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1968)) (emphasis added).
69. "In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are
sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an
unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly
to be attributed to Congress." Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341,351 (1943). The decision in
Parker was firmly grounded on principles of federalism. See also Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 398, 438 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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federal interest in the unimpeded flow of interstate commerce.70
It is necessary that the courts closely guard state sovereignty;
"federal regulation[s] . . . should not be instruments for keeping
individual states from moving ahead to meet social needs by local action."71 However, while attention is given to the fulfillment
of individual needs through state regulation, those needs must
be fulfilled carefully in order not to inhibit Congress in its attempt to solve national problems.?' The use of flexible yet
clearly defined standards should simplify the analysis and enable the courts to accomplish that result.
The standards outlined above should aid courts as they attempt to determine the validity of competing state and federal
interests and solve issues similar to those presented in United
Transportation Union. The first four factors should define those
activities that may be properly exempt from federal intervention. The final factor serves to balance the federal and state interests and ensure that fair consideration is given to the particular facts of the case before a decision is rendered. Therefore,
even though a material segment of a public service may affect
interstate commerce, if that portion does not constitute a predominant part of the overall enterprise, and the state interest in
preserving the intrastate function outweighs the federal interest
in regulating interstate commerce, the federal regulation should
not be permitted to interfere with the state service.
Federal intervention that increases state costs, reduces state
programs, causes displacement of state policies, and impairs the
state's ability to structure employer-employee relationships,
70. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S.(12 How.) 299, 318-321 (1851).
71. Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State, Constitutional Rights
in the Public Sector, 39 WASH.L. REV.4, 28 (1964).
72. See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 Hmv. L. REV.1065, 1092 (1977).
The article also discusses factors which might be considered to allow a federal regulation
to prevail over state interests. "A number of justifications may be available to overcome
such state challenges . . . . [Where] the federal regulation clearly does not jeopardize
state provision of essential services . . . [or where] the federal government is bearing any
increased cost or providing an adequate substitute for the state service it is regulating,"
the federal interest might be determinative. Id. at 1096-97. This factor seems closely
akin to the availability of the state provided service in the marketplace. If an alternative
source for the service exists, then there is no reason to restrict the federal regulation of
the state controlled public function. However, the fact that the federal government
furnishes financial support should not be determinative, as such assistance exists in
other areas of integral state government functions. See National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. at 878 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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might be impermissible interferences of state functions," depending on the situation. Federal intervention in those cases
should be regarded as the exception rather than the rule." However, where the circumstances before the court favor the implementation of the federal regulation or some particular federal
interest requires protection," the state interest should conform
to federal legislation. Therefore, if enforcement of the federal
regulation would not jeopardize the state provision of "essential"
services, then there would be sufEcient grounds for upholding
the federal interest.
The constant balancing of the competing state and federal
interests enables the law to remain an important force in the
development and structuring of society.76In addition, that balancing provides the courts with enough flexibility to react to historical, empirical, and social developments. Use of the suggested
guidelines should complement the existing procedure by di73. See Horowitz, The Autonomy of The University of California Under The State
Constitution, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV.23, 33 (1978).
74. See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
L. REV. 543,
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM.
544-45 (1954). In addition, the tenth amendment, by its terms, does not prohibit certain
congressional action. Rather, it is simply an example
of the understanding of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution that
the States were sovereign in many respects, and that although their legislative
authority could be superseded by Congress in many areas where Congress was
competent to act, Congress was nonetheless not free to deal with a State as if it
were just another individual or business enterprise subject to regulation.
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 557 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice
Rehnquist wrote the Court's opinion in Usery.
75. State Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ga. 1976). The
federally guaranteed right of certain employees to strike in United Transportation
Union, however, does not override the state interest in preserving the smooth operation
of its mass transit system.
76. For additional insight into the support and handling of the balancing approach,
see Shapiro, Mr. Jwtice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HAW. L. REV.293 (1976),
and Tushnet, supra note 64, at 1301. Mr. Tushnet perceived the effect of Usery as reasserting a judicial role in protecting state and local interests against congressional
intrusion.
States provide a haven for individual activity safe from overreaching by the
national government. Local citizens are able to control state government more
easily than national citizens can control a national government. Further, even
if a local minority is oppressed, the opportunity for migration without breaking
all ties to one's homeland exists where the oppressor is a local government:
[but] it does not where the oppressor is the national government.
Id. at 1346.
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recting the courts' attention to the relevant factors in each case
and enabling the judiciary to reach fairly considered solutions.
Guy P. Kroesche

